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INTRODUCTION

This Comment discusses opportunities for women to acquire equal
property rights by using mechanisms available under human rights
treaties. The discussion focuses on women in North, Central, and
South America, living in countries that are part of the Inter-American
System' for the protection of human rights.
The principles and theories this Comment discusses for acquiring
property rights are broadly applicable and relevant to women who
live in countries that are parties to other human rights treaties.'
These principles and theories are most relevant to women in the
European System, which, like the Inter-American System, has both a
commission and a court to implement human rights conventions.5
This Comment is less directly applicable, but still relevant, to the
African System in which the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights implements human rights conventions.4
A.

Organization

Part II.A of this Comment will discuss the current status of women
in the world and the relationship between that status and property
1. For a complete discussion of the Inter-American System see infra Part II.C. This
Comment refers specifically to countries which are parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]:
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
2. See Richard J. Wilson, Researching the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: A Litigator'sPerspective, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 5 (1994) (observing that

the regional systems of Europe and Africa both operate human rights commissions roughly
analogous to those used in the Inter-American System). For a description of rights within the
European System see The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention); in
the African System see African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adoptedJune 27, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter African Charter].
3. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUB11C INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
NUTsHELL 128-30 (2d ed. 1990).

4. See id. at 140-41.
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rights. Part ll.B will then explore the current status of the property
rights of women in Latin America. Finally, Part II.C will give an
overview of the Inter-American system. Part III will explore how
deprivation of property rights violates human rights treaties and how
the Inter-American Court and the Commission on Human Rights
have treated similar rights. Part III will then attempt to evaluate the
usefulness of human rights treaties and their organs to women trying
to obtain equal property rights. Part IV will discuss the potential
avenues available for women to acquire equal property rights.
Finally, this Comment recommends that women in Organization of
American States5 ("OAS") countries utilize OAS organs to fight for
equal property rights.
H. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.

The Relationship between Women's Human Rights and PrapertyRights

1. Status
Globally, women remain in an inferior economic position relative
to men and continue to suffer odious human rights abuses.6
Deprivation of property rights is itself a human rights abuse.7 This
particular human rights8 abuse facilitates other abuses such as
domestic violence and female genital mutilation. 9
5. The OAS is a regional organization of states in North and South America. For a more
extensive discussion of the OAS see infra Part II.C.
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUiAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1993 xvi-xvii (Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter HuAN RIGHTS PRACFICES]
(giving an overview of human rights abuses around the world including: physical and sexual
abuse, dowry deaths, and legally unrecognized marital rape). The report also found:
In 1993, women throughout the world were subjected to onerous and discriminatory
restrictions of such fundamental freedoms as voting, marriage, travel, testifying in
court, inheriting and owning property, and obtaining custody of children. All too
often, women and girls find their access to education, employment, health care, and
even food is limited because of their gender.
Id.; see also NinaJ. Crimm, Introductory Remarks: Women's Rights as InternationalHuman Rights, 69
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1995) (summarizing and commenting on the State Department's
findings regarding the status of women).
7. SeeJay M. Vogelson, Women's Human Rights, 30 INT'LLAW. 209, 210 (1996) ("Generally,
the right of an individual to own some property and not be deprived of it arbitrarily is
recognized as a human right.").
8. See Celina Romany, Claiming a Global Identity: Latinola Critical Scholarship and
International Human Rights, 28 U. MIAlI INTER-AM. L. REv. 215, 217 (1997) (describing the
generation framework for human rights). First generation rights are civil and political rights.
Id. Second generation rights are social, economic, and cultural rights. Id. Third generation
rights are those which transcend the individual, such as the right to development and self
determination. Id.
9. SeeGregoryA. Kelson, GrantingPoliticalAsylum to PotentialVictims of Female Circumcision,
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For decades, feminists have fought to improve the human rights
conditions for women under international law using a gender-based °
approach." In recent years, feminist legal scholars have expressed
dissatisfaction with the progress made under the gender-based
model. 12 In reaction to the perceived deficiencies in the genderbased approach, one school of feminist thought advocates pursuing
women's human rights under non-gender specific or general human
rights instruments, therefore bringing women's human rights into
the mainstream." Proponents of the mainstreaming movement
reason that, because women are human beings, they should defend
their rights using general human rights treaties rather than separate
gender-based initiatives. 4 Using this mainstreaming theory, women
who are unable to obtain a satisfactory remedy within their own legal
systems for human rights abuses can bring their cases to general
international human rights bodies.
3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 257, 297 (1995) ("Internal flight [within Nigeria] to escape female
circumcision is often impossible because most tribal laws and customs do not allow women to
own property in their own right or hold ajob. Therefore a woman's independence would be
very difficult to achieve and maintain, and many women who flee would ultimately be forced to
return to their families."); see alsoMarsha A. Freeman, The Human Rights of Women Under CEDAW
Convention: Complexities and Opportunities of Compliance; 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 378, 380
(1997) (stating that "equal access to and distribution of property" is fundamental to the
enjoyment of other rights).
10. In this Comment, the term "gender-based" refers to initiatives created specifically to
address the rights of women.
11. See Christine Ainetter Brautigam, Mainstreaminga Gender Perspective in the Work of the
United NationsHuman Rights Treaty Bodies, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 389 (1997) (stating that
women have pursued equality and advancement through the United Nations on both
mainstream and gender-specific tracks).
12. SeeJulie A. Minor, An Analysis of StructuralWeaknesses in the Convention on the Elimination
ofAllForms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women, 24 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 143 (criticizing the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, a gender-based initiative, for
failing to bring about its mandate); see also infra Part I.B.2 for a discussion of gender-based
initiatives. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelly Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) (critiquing institutions,
agreements, and procedures in international law for their ineffectiveness in addressing issues
affecting women).
13. See DonnaJ. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 154 (1994) (observing that, in anticipation of the World
Conference, the Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution integrating women's
human rights into the "mainstream" program).
14. Advocates of mainstreaming argue that it is a mistake to separate women's rights from
human rights. See Cecilia Medina, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of the Enjoyment of Human
Rights by Women in the American System, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 257, 257-58 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (summarizing her
general approach to women's rights in international law: that women are human and therefore
entitled to human rights); see also Brautigam, supra note 11, at 390. Brautigam describes the
mainstreaning of gender rights as the expansion of the traditional boundaries of human rights.
Id. Under this more expansive definition of human rights, the law recognizes the inequalities
women suffer as a result of gender bias. Id.
15. See Medina, supranote 14, at 271.
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Acquiring property rights is a particularly important human rights
issue because without property rights women are unable to effectively
exercise other human rights." Inequality in property rights is a major
hindrance to correcting internationally recognized problems women
face such as generally inferior economic status,17 domestic violence, 8
and female genital mutilation. 9 Without property rights, it is difficult
for women to be individual economic actors.20 In order to survive,
people who are not economic actors must attach themselves to
people who are. In that situation, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
a woman to exercise any right in a way that risks estranging her from

16. See discussion supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
property rights to the enjoyment of other human rights).
17. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Dividingthe Surplus: Will GlobalizationGive Women a Larger
or Smaller Share of the Benefits of CooperativeProduction?, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 51, 53

(1996) ("In 1980, the United Nations estimated that although women did two-thirds of the
world's work, they earned only one-tenth of the world's income and owned only one-hundredth
of the world's property."); Emily MacFarquhar, Jennifer Seter, Susan V. Lawrence, Robin
Knight &-JoannieM. Schrof, The War Against Women in Much of the World Politicaland Economic
'rogress' Has Been Dragging Them Backward, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1994, at 42
(discussing the global pattern of women working more than men while receiving less
remuneration).
18. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, 1535 (affirming that "violence against
women pervades every sector of society regardless of class, race, or ethnic group, income,
culture, level of education, age or religion and strikes at its very foundations").
19. The case of female genital mutilation ("FGM") is a particularly compelling example of
why equal property rights are essential to the exercise of other rights. FGM is the removal of
part or all of the clitoris and labia. See AMNESTY INTERNATiONAL, HUMiAN RIGHTS ARE WOMEN'S
RIGHTS 132 (1995); See also Kirsten M. Backstrom, The InternationalHuman Rights of the Child: Do
they Protect the Female Child?, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 541, 545 (1997) (stating that

FGM is practiced in central Africa, parts of the Arabian Peninsula, India, Pakistan, and various
countries in South America). Consider the situation of the mother of a female child in a
community where FGM is the norm and women cannot effectively control property. See Kelson,
supra note 9, at 297. If a mother knows that her daughter cannot inherit property, retain
control of property she earns, or exercise control over marital property, the future well-being of
that child is dependent on her marrying. Id. If women who have not undergone FGM are not
considered appropriate brides and are ostracized within that community, a mother who does
not subject her daughter to FGM sentences her daughter to a life as a destitute outcast. Id.
20. As an example, lack of property rights has been an obstacle to women claiming
development rights. Land reform laws and resettlement programs exclude women from the
bases of rural productivity by denying women land ownership, by stipulating 'exceptions' for
women in cases where full land ownership is granted, and by masculinizing the concept of the
head of household. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human RightsRules, Realities, and the Role of Cultur" A FormulaforReform, 21 BROOL.J. INT'L L. 605, 639 (1996)
[hereinafter Rules and Realities] (citing Nadia H. Youssef, Women's Access to ProductiveResources:
The Need for Legal Instruments to Protect Women's Development Rights, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECrTVES 279, 281 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds.,

1995)). Women constitute only "one third of the economically active population" in Latin
American states. See Medina, supranote 14, at 261; see alsoHUMAN RIGHTS PRAGICES, supra note
6, at 455 (reporting that in Guatemala, women comprise only 24% of the economically active
population).
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that economic actor.2 ' This reality keeps women in an inferior
position within marriages, families, and society.2
In many countries within the OAS, women do not have equal
property rights in law and/or in practice.'
The denial of equal
property rights is a violation of the Inter-American Convention on
Human Rights. In order to improve the human rights conditions
for women in Latin America, non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") and individuals should utilize the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court to
pressure member states to (1) bring their domestic legislation into
compliance with the convention,o and (2) defend women's rights in
specific instances where a woman cannot get a remedy in her own
justice system."
2.

Property Laws in Latin America

Latin American countries derived their modem property laws from
the Napoleonic Code brought by the Europeans to the Americas.27
Over time the concept of property shifted from the ideal of absolute
property rights to relative property rights and the idea of property
ownership as a social function 28 and privilege.' In keeping with this
21. See Medina, supra note 14, at 260-62 (describing the economic and social
manifestations of discrimination against Latin American women and how these manifestations
subordinate Latin American women); see also Kelson, supranote 9, at 297 (describing how their
lack of property rights prevents women from fleeing FGM).
22. See Linda Robinson & Jack Epstein, Battered by the Myth of Machismo Violence Against
Women is Endemic in Brazil U.S. NEvs & WoRLD REP., Apr. 4, 1994, at 40 (explaining the
prevailing attitudes toward women in Brazilian society, anthropologist Richard Parker said "[i]n
Brazil... [a) good woman is one controlled, first by her father, who guards her virginity and
then by her husband, whose property she becomes").
23. See Steven E. Hendrix, Property Law Innovation in Latin America with Recommendations, 18
B.C. INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 1, 13 (1995) (stating that under the agrarian reforms in many Latin
American states, women are unable to inherit land unless the male "head of household" has
deserted the family). The article also notes that although women ostensibly have equal
property rights in civil
law jurisdictions, "[l]ocal groups that decide disputes, however, often
give all real property to the sons, irrespective of the law." Id. at 13-14; see also discussion infra
Part lA.2.
24. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-2, 21, 24, 25; see also discussion infra Part
III.B.1.
25. See discussion infraPart Ill.
26. See Claudio Grossman, The Inter-American System: Opportunitiesfor Women's Rights, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1995) (stating that litigants can bring unsuccessful domestic claims
before international supervisory organs).
27. See Hendrix, supra note 23, at 5 (stating that although the Napoleonic Code provides
absolute property rights, Latin American legal doctrine establishes relative property rights).
28. See Hendrix, supra note 23, at 8 (defining social function as a "catchall term which
refers to the notion that land should be used to promote social and economic development,
rather than simply viewed as a market commodity").
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conception of property, some countries began implementing
agrarian reforms." These reforms broke up large estates into small
producer-owned plots.31 The goals of these reforms were equality in
land ownership and the elimination of peasant worker exploitation.32
There are any number of ways in which societies deprive women of
equal property rights. One way is simply not to allow women to hold
property." Another way is either to limit or prohibit women from
inheriting property," or to have default rules that favor men. Yet
another way to discriminate against women is in the implementation
of agrarian reform and development schemes.s It is also possible to
deny women equal property rights through the definition of the
marital relationship or through divorce laws.3 7
29. See Hendrix, sup-a note 23, at 8-9 (noting that land grants are subject to restrictions
and are therefore seen as a privilege rather than a right).
30. See Hendrix, supra note 23, at 8-9 & nn.46-48 (indicating that a number of Latin
American countries implemented agrarian reform including Venezuela, Honduras, Ecuador,
and Peru).
31. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 7.
32. For a discussion of the specific types of grants and titles provided by reform programs
see Hendrix, supranote 23, at 8-13.
33. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: a Re/Conceptualizationof
Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607, 617 (1997) [hereinafter
Re/Conceptualization of Violence] ("[Wlomen suffer direct economic oppression by virtue of
systems that prohibit them from inheriting and owning property."); Grimm, supra note 6, at 4-5
& n.23 (stating that South Africa has only recently reformed its laws to allow married women to
own property and enter into contracts without their husbands' consent) (citing Jerelyn
Eddings, Fighting the Next Battle: Neglected in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle, Women Pushfor Equal
Rights; South Africa, U.S. NEIvs & WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 1994, at 53).
34. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20, at 639-40; see also HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICES, supra
note 6, at 222. In Nigeria, a woman cannot inherit her husband's property "unless she can
prove that she contributed to the acquisition of that property." Id. Under customary tenure
systems, only men own land. Id Women may gain access to land through marriage, although
some customary practices even prevent women from inheriting their husband's land. Id. See
also Florence Butegwa, Using the African Charteron Human and People's Rights to Secure Women's
Access to Land in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECtIVE 495, 498 (RebeccaJ. Cook ed., 1994) (citing a Tanzanian High Court Decision
holding that daughters cannot inherit their fathers' land).
35. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1997, 343-44
(stating that, under Rwandan law, women face economic difficulties as second-class citizens).
In Uganda, for example, women cannot inherit property unless they are specifically designated
as beneficiaries. See Butegwa, supra note 34, at 497 (reporting that the Ugandan Succession Act
and Succession Decree 1972 allow a surviving wife to inherit property from her husband if she is
specifically named in his will). Very few Ugandans have wills because it is considered to be a
bad omen. Id.
36. See Re/Conceptualizationof Violence, supranote 33, at 617 (stating that some development
schemes deny women access to economic benefits and women only receive a small share of
credit).
37. See Vogelson, supra note 7, at 210; see also Freeman, supra note 9, at 380 n.7 ("Under
customary law, applicable to over 90% of the marriages in Zimbabwe, women have no rights to
marital property upon divorce."); see also Butegwa, supra note 34, at 496 (stating that in Uganda,
the law does not consider women's domestic work to be a contribution toward her husband's
accumulation of property. Therefore, a wife will not receive a share of the marital property
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Due to the seemingly endless variations of ways in which countries
deprive women of their property rights, it is impossible to detail them
all here. The sections below will instead examine three examples of
discriminatory practices and provisions that women in OAS countries
could challenge under international law.
a. Head of Household Designation
Agrarian reform laws normally grant land to the father figure in a
family. By granting land to the father figure these laws fail to legally
recognize any woman as a possible "head of the household." 9 In
order for a woman to receive the benefits of agrarian reform laws, she
must show that the father has abandoned the family.40 Once she has
made this showing, "the woman
can receive benefits as if she were the
41
head of the household."

b. Laws Making a Husband Guardian of His Wife
In some countries, such as Chile, the law considers women to be
under the guardianship of their husbands, therefore lacking the
authority to exercise control over marital property.42 In practical
terms, this lack of control leaves married women without access to
real assets.' Unless a woman has separate assets outside of the
marriage, she must depend on the good will of her husband or
friends and family for survival.44

upon distribution unless she can show that she made some monetary contribution towards its
purchase); see also HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 6, at 390 (reporting that Chilean law

does not allow divorce, although Chilean courts often dissolve marriages by annulment). As an
annulled marriage never legally existed, former wives and children are not entitled to financial
support. Id.
38. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 13 (citing CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUB1CA DE VENEZUELA

arts. 73, 93).
39. Hendrix, supra note 23, at 13 (citing CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLUCA DE VENEZUELA

arts. 73, 93).
40. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 13 (citing CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA
arts. 73, 93).

41. Hendrix, supra note 23, at 13.
42. See Re/Conceptualizationof Violenc supra note 33, at 623 (noting that under this concept

of guardianship, married women in Botswana, Chile, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland do not
retain the right to manage their own property).
43. See Kelson, supra note 9, at 297 (discussing how tribal laws that prohibit property
ownership for Nigerian women hinder those women in achieving and maintaining
independence); see also HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 6, at 517 (commenting on the
lack of economic opportunities for Panamanian women, which may be due in part to
Panamanian law's non recognition of property in common).
44. Cf HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 6, at 517 ("Panamanian law does not
recognize property in common, and divorced or deserted women are often left destitute.").
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Equal Rights on Paper Ignored in Favor of Customary
Practices

Even in civil code jurisdictions, where women normally have equal
inheritance rights to men, those rights are not always afforded to
them. 5 Under customary tenure systems, it is often automatic that
sons receive real assets upon marriage. Women traditionally receive
only personal property, which they can take with them to their
husband's land.47 In accordance with this tradition, those deciding
the distribution of property are apt to disregard applicable law and
give real property to the sons.4 For instance, in developing countries
"resettlement schemes... are carried out at local levels by
administrative officers who may be ignorant of, or may deliberately
ignore, legal provisions for joint title or ownership of property by
women in their own name."49
B. Movements to Improve Global Conditionsfor Women through
InternationalLaw
First, a word on why international law is so crucial to the
improvement of the condition of women globally. In the United
States, we tend to think of domestic legislation and our federal and
state constitutions as the most important instruments for the
protection of our human and civil rights. 0 Many women around the
world live in countries whose laws and judiciaries do not afford
women basic rights.5 In this context, where domestic instruments are
not available or not effective, international law is a very important
tool for women to obtain and defend their rights.52
45. SeeHendrix, supra note 28, at 13-14.
46. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 14.
47. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 14.
48. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 13-14 (stating that discrimination within Latin American
legal systems is itself a serious problem); Robinson & Epstein, supranote 22, at 41 (observing
that "Brazil's legal system is colored by centuries of discrimination against women"); see also
MARIA

DAKOLIAS,

THE JUDICIAL

SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF

50 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996) (reporting that women in Latin
America face disproportionately high barriers to accessing justice because they are more likely
to be poor and suffer higher rates of illiteracy resulting in less knowledge of legal rights and the
judicial system).
49. Freeman, supranote 9, at 380.
50. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 4 (1997)
(stating that the protection of individual liberties is popularly regarded as the American
Constitution's most significant goal).
51. See HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supranote 6, at xvi-xvii (reporting that states around the
world continue to restrict or deny women's basic social and political rights).
52. SeeRebeccaj. Cook, Women, inTHE UNITED NATIONSAND INTERNATIONAL LAW 181,181
REFORM

(Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997) [hereinafter Women] (arguing that women should not view
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Perhaps even more important, international law influences
domestic legislation.53 Women can challenge discriminatory laws in
their own countries on the theory that the law fails to comply with the
country's obligations under treaties to which it is a party."
1. Under-representation of Women in International Law
Women's interests are not well represented in international legal
bodies." Initially, the problem was that women were excluded from
the formal institutions creating international law. Women were and
are under-represented among lawmakers 57 As a result, lawmakers
have not incorporated a feminine perspective, or "woman's voice" in
the formulation of human rights instruments." International bodies
formulated early human rights instruments without women's input."
As a consequence, though equality provisions are present in human
rights instruments, the structure of international law made it very
difficult for women to defend their rights.6
the system of international human rights law as guaranteeing their rights, rather, they should
view international human rights bodies as presenting opportunities to expose violations of
women's human rights and to pursue prospects of redress).
53. See infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discussing Provision 140 of the Peruvian
Constitution and the Court's application of human rights instruments to domestic laws).
54. See Medina, supra note 14, at 275 (noting that the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights can make advisory opinions on the country's compliance with human rights
instruments); see also discussion infraPart IllI.B.I.
55. See RebeccaJ. Cook, State Responsibilityfor Violations of Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV.

HUM. RTs.J. 125, 130 (1994) [hereinafter State Responsibility] (arguing that the historical origins
of international law in commerce and military conflict "have resulted in masculine-gendered
doctrines, institutions, and imagery").
56. See Rules and Realities, supra note 20, at 617 (asserting that initially women had to
achieve visibility outside of the formal international system "because women were excluded
from all aspects and levels of official international structures and policy-making").
57. Cf Rules and Realities, supra note 20, at 633 n.105 (noting that the United Nations
described women as "the largest excluded group in the world" and also labeled women a "nonparticipating majority" because women comprise the majority of the world's population but
receive "only a small share of developmental opportunities").
58. Cf Rebecca J. Cook, Implementation and Effectiveness of United States Sponsored World
Conferences: AdvancingInternationalLaw Regarding Women, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 310, 312

(1997) [hereinafter Advancing InternationalLaw] ("A source of friction between prevailing
international law and feminist criticism of its failure to realize its promise is that women's
interests are not made relevant to the planning, achievement or enforcement of human rights
conventions, because such steps are conditioned by male environments that exclude women's
voices.").
59. See Rules and Realities, supra note 20, at 630 (arguing that, until recently, women's
concerns and perspectives were absent from international human rights discourse and the
.rules were not made by women for women").
60. See Rules and Realities,supranote 20, at 630-31 (arguing that, as a result of the exclusion
of women from international human rights discourse, the structure of international human
rights law is not conducive to addressing women's issues). For a more general critique of
United Nation's law making and proposals for reform see Theodor Meron, Reforming United
NationsHuman Rights Law Making 80 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 175 (1986).
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A prime example of a structural obstacle to women's human rights
is the public/private distinction.6' Classically, international law can
only address the public sphere because international law only governs
the conduct of states.6' Many violations of women's human rights are
considered private wrongs because individuals commit them against
other individuals.6 As a result of this distinction, international legal
bodies could not effectively address many of the issues critical to
women's human rights such as bride burning, female genital
mutilation, and domestic violence.64 This frustrating reality led
women to take an alternative route towards obtaining recognition of
their needs by the international legal community, by holding forums
M
to specifically address violations of women's human rights.6
2.

Gender-Based Movements

The movement for women's human rights developed on a "parallel
track" with the growth of formal human rights bodies.6 6 Nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") formed a bridge between
grassroots women's organizations and international human rights
bodies.67 The United Nations Convention on Women brought
61. See Sullivan, supra note 13, at 156-58 (highlighting the changes in the Vienna

Declaration & Programme of Action that recognize the important public concern for issues
previously considered private).
62. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Women's Human Rights: The Twenty-Frst Century, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L LJ. 1748, 1748-49 (1995) (describing the traditional western distinction between the
public sphere, which encompasses work, politics, and macro-economics, and the private sphere
of home and family). Traditionally, governments have tried not to interfere in the private
sphere of their constituents. Id. Until recently, international law makers continued this
distinction by maintaining that international law only governs relations between states. Id. at
1749. As a result, international law did not reach the private sphere, in which many violations
of women's human rights continued unchecked. Id.
63. See id at 1749-50 (noting that sexual harassment and domestic violence are examples of
violations of women's human rights by private actors).
64. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20, at 608-09 ("[iTihe flawed public/private dichotomy
historically interfered with the recognition of wrongs inflicted on women because of their sex
such as domestic violence .... This false public/private dichotomy, in the name of the 'rule of
law,' has ghettoized women's interests and conspired to deny equal status to women.").
65. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20, at 617 (arguing that the exclusion of women from
the formal system of international law forced women to go outside that formal system in order
to gain recognition of women's issues).
66. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20, at 617 ("This parallel track was necessary because
women were excluded from all aspects and levels of official international structures and policymaking."); see also Cook, Advancing InternationalLaw, supra note 58, at 312 (describing the
phenomenon of international conferences increasingly attracting "parallel NGO forums"). At
these parallel forums, women testify to the failures of existing human rights protections and the
persistent gap between the rights promised under international law and the continuing reality
of inequality. Id.
67. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20, at 617 (explaining that grassroots movements by
women have been able to bridge the gap to the "formalistic/traditional international
framework").
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women's rights to the forefront in 1948.6 Since then there have been
a number of other international conventions and treaties that address
the human rights of women.6 9 The strongest and most ambitious of
these instruments is the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW"). 70 CEDAW requires
states to reach beyond the goal of non-discrimination and to
specifically address the disadvantaged position of women.'
These initial separate women's conferences were very successful in
bringing women's rights issues to the attention of international legal72
bodies and obtaining legal instruments recognizing women's

rights.

However, the conferences had limited success in actually improving
m One reason for this failure
the human rights conditions of women."
is that the separate institutions developed to implement these
instruments are comparatively weak. 74 They simply lack the authority
68. See Rules and Realities,supranote 20, at 618 (noting that, as a result of the work of NGOs
bringing women's rights to the attention of the international community, sex was included in
the non-discrimination clauses of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (I) (Dec. 10, 1948), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3).
69. See, e.g., The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter
CEDAW]; The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Race
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD];
American Convention, supranote 1; African Charter, supranote 2; European Convention, supra
note 2; Report of the International Conference on Development on Population and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 171/13 (1994); Report of the World Summit for Social
Development, Principles and Goals, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995); United Nations Fourth
World Conference on Women, Beiing Declaration and Draft Platform for Action, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (1995); see alsoRules andRealities,supra note 20, at 623.
70. CEDAW, supranote 69; see also discussion infranote 74.
71. See Women, supra note 52, at 188 (arguing that CEDAW is particularly innovative
because, rather than framing women's rights in relation to those of men by guaranteeing
equality, CEDAWjust prohibits discrimination against women).
72. See Rules andRealities,supra note 20, at 617 (arguing that, as a result of women's efforts
on the "parallel track," recent conferences in Rio, Vienna, Cairo, and Beiing began integrating
women's concerns into the international human rights framework).
73. See Rules and Realities, supra note 20, at 629 ("[D]espite the rules that the lofty
aspirational goals of equality [gender-specific treaties set, the results of the recognition of
women's rights in human rights treaties] have fallen short of expectations and obligations
creating a large schism... between women's 'paper' rights and the realities of their everyday
lives.").
74. CEDAW is an excellent example of the difficulty with separate gender-based
instruments. See Minor, supra note 12, at 137. The UN Commission on the Status of Women
drafted CEDAW. Id. at 138. Although other treaties have addressed women's rights, CEDAW is
the most comprehensive. Id. at 138-39. CEDAW, however, has failed to bring about the
changes in its mandate. Id. at 141. One problem with CEDAW is that the drafters allowed
countries to make numerous reservations in order to ensure greater participation. Id. at 144.
The Women's Committee, which is to implement the treaty, lacks the power to do so. See
Minor, supranote 12, at 148. The Committee has not established reporting standards and states
will often not include controversial areas in their reports. Id. at 149. The Committee also
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and resources to implement the agreements and ensure
compliance.75 A second problem is the structure of the instruments
themselves, which tends to place affirmative duties on member
states." A third problem is that the public/private distinction
remains an obstacle to women getting cases concerning violations of
their human rights before international human rights bodies."
3.

Mainstreaming Movement

The mainstreaming movement 87 developed in response to the
remaining weaknesses in the parallel track system. By bringing their
complaints to general human rights bodies rather than the separate
bodies created to address women's issues, those in the mainstreaming
suffers from its geographic location. Id. at 148-49. The Women's Committee is located in
Vienna while the other six major UN treaty bodies are in Geneva, separating it from experts,
advice, and resources. Id.; see also Meron, supra note 60, at 175. Compared to other UN
treaties, the implementation provisions of CEDAW are very weak. Id. at 175. CEDAW also lacks
an optional procedure to allow the committee to hear individual complaints. Id. at 216. See
generally Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 8 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 2-83 (1996)
(giving a thorough analysis of CEDAW and evaluating the viability of protecting women's rights
through a "universalist" approach). Southard notes that in 1992, CEDAW bound 117 nations,
yet numerous practices that violate its provisions such as female genital mutilation, veiling,
dowry, and battery continued. Id. at 6; see also Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations
Regime and the Convention on DiscriminationAgainst Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 288 (1991)
(analyzing the meaning and impact of reservations to CEDAW).
75. See Meron, supranote 60, at 176 (noting that the Committee meets for a maximum of
two weeks per year and discussing weaknesses in the structures which implement CEDAW).
76. See Brautigam, supra note 11, at 390 (noting that the human rights-based approach has
the advantage of focusing on women's entitlements under international law, and comparing
this approach to the less desirable welfare and protection approach taken in some gender-based
initiatives that imposes duties on states rather than providing women with remedies).
77. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Concluding Remarks, Making Women rsible:
Setting an Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 69 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 231, 232 (1994) (arguing that
the abolition of the public/private dichotomy in international law is an essential step in
reformulating international law so that it can effectively address women's human rights).
78. See generally Advancing International Law, supra note 58, at 310 (analyzing and
hypothesizing about the evolution of international law regarding women). Cook argues that
international law regarding women is evolving in four overlapping stages: (1) focusing on
specific legal rights of women; (2) treaties for the enforcement of the prohibition of
discrimination against women; (3) reaction to and elimination of structural violations of
women's rights; and (4) the integration of women's concerns into more general treaties. Id.
79. See Andrew Byrnes, Slow and Steady Wins the Race: The Development of an OptionalProtocol
to the Women's Convention, 91 AM. SOC'YINT'L L. PROC. 383, 383 (1997) (stating that, in response
to feminist and activist calls to strengthen human rights machinery, two movements have
developed: one to strengthen gender-specific human rights instruments, and a second to
mainstream gender concerns through the existing human rights machinery); see alsoBrautigam,
supra note 11, at 389-90 (arguing that while there is still a need for a gender-specific approach,
mainstreaming is particularly important in the area of human rights because general human
rights institutions: (1) interact with states to assess compliance with treaty obligations;
(2) interpret rights through comments and recommendations that create a jurisprudence
which has the potential to transform state behavior, and (3) create a rights-based framework, as
opposed to the welfare-protection framework, which portrays women as victims and
dependants).
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movement believe they can get more effective remedies" for
violations of women's human rights."
The institutions that
implement general human rights treaties tend to be older and better
established.ss These institutions already have effective procedures in
place."' General human rights treaties tend to have the resources to
review and investigate more reports.' Finally, they tend to have
optional protocols in place to hear individual cases.85
C. The Inter-AmericanSystem
The Inter-American System serves the members of the
Organization of American States ("OAS")." s The OAS has thirty-five
members and is the world's oldest regional organization."
The
80. See Brautigam, supra note 11, at 391 (arguing that one of the reasons that general
human rights treaties have not brought about recognition of women's human rights is that
states have only a limited understanding of the content of these treaties as they apply to
women). Brautigam calls for the pursuit of women's human rights within the treaty bodies on
two levels. Id. On one level, she recommends a conceptualization of the rights guaranteed by
the treaties and the corresponding state obligations. Id. On another level, she recommends
including gender perspectives and gender issues in the dialogue with state parties and in the
bodies' comments and recommendations. Id.
81. The doctrine of state responsibility is central to the defense of women's rights under
either gender-specific instruments or general human rights instruments.
The doctrine of state responsibility holds a state accountable for breaches of
international obligations committed by or attributable to the state. Breaches may arise
from violations of customary international law or binding treaties. Recent
developments in the international law of state responsibility for violations of human
rights widen the scope of international obligations and enhance the potential for
enforcement of these obligations. States must now protect and individual's exercise
and enjoyment of human rights, investigate alleged violations, punish proven violators,
and provide effective remedies, including compensation of victims. Nonetheless,
states are seldom held responsible for ignoring their international obligations with
respect to women's human rights.
State Responsibiity,supra note 55, at 127-28 (citations omitted).

82. State parties ratified CEDAW in 1979, ICCPR in 1966, the African Charter in 1982, the
European Charter in 1950, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
adoptedMay 2, 1948, Basic Doc. Hum. Rts. Inter-Am. Sys. 17, OEA/ser. L.V/II.92 doc. 31 rev. 3
[hereinafter American Declaration], in 1948. Note that the international community created
most of these treaties and institutions several years before the states ratified CEDAW.
83. For instance, the other six major treaties and their associated institutions are located in
Geneva and have the Centre for Human Rights at their disposal. Minor, supranote 12, at 149.
These bodies have also benefited from innovations in UN procedure, such as the appointment
of special rapporteurs in specific issues. Meron, supra note 60, at 176.
84. See discussion supranote 74 and accompanying text.
85. Optional protocols exist to the American Convention, supra note 1, art. 44; ICCPR,
supra note 68; GERD, supra note 69; and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
51 at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1985).
86. Medina, supra note 14, at 263.
87. The

OAS

and

the

Inter-American

System

(visited

Oct.

18,

1998)

<http://wzv.oas.org/en/pinfo/oas/oas.htm> [hereinafter The OAS and the Inter-American
System]. The First International Conference of American States took place from October 1889
to April 1890 in Washington, D.C. Id. Member states signed the OAS Charter in Bogoti in
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system's two primary human rights instruments are the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Manss (the "Declaration")
and the American Convention on Human Rights (the
"Convention").' The Convention is a general human rights treaty
ratified by twenty-five member states and the Declaration provides a
basic catalogue of human rights, including equality and nondiscrimination." The Inter-American System has two organs that
implement the Convention: the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court.9'
1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the
"Commission") is a permanent body that meets several times per year
and for special sessions as needed.92 Although its headquarters are in
Washington, D.C., the Commission has held sessions in several
member countries."
The Commission is comprised of seven
members elected by the OAS general assembly.94 The Commission
monitors the compliance of member states to the Convention and
the Declaration. 95 The Commission carries out its purpose through
several functions: developing an awareness of human rights within
the Americas;96 providing advisory services on human rights; 97 making
1948. Id. The original goals of the OAS were primarily to resolve and prevent disputes between
member countries, and promote economic, social, and cultural development. Id. Today the
goals of the OAS have expanded to include: promoting and protecting human rights,
combating corruption, eliminating the threat of national and international terrorism, building
mutual confidence, and strengthening the role of women in society among others. Id.
88. SeAmerican Declaration, supra note 82.
89. See The OAS and the Inter-American System, supra note 87 (stating that the American
Convention on Human Rights is the human rights treaty for the Inter-American System).
Members signed the Convention in 1969. However, it did not enter into force until 1978. Id.
The Convention also created the Inter-American Court. Seediscussion infra Part II.C.2.
90. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 1 (1);American Declaration, supranote 82, art.
II; see The OAS and the Inter-American System, supranote 87 (describing the roles of human rights
instruments in the OAS system).
91. See American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 34-64 (describing the organizations and
procedures for the Commission and Court); Medina, supranote 14, at 265.
92. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (visited Jan. 29, 2000)
<http://vvv.cidh.oas.org/what's%20the%20ACHR.htm>
[hereinafter
Inter-American
Commission].
93. See Inter-American Commission, supra note 92.
94. Id.; American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 34-36; see also Medina, supra note 14, at
265 (describing the Commission and its activities).
95. See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41 (stating the main functions the
Commission uses to promote and defend human rights); see also Medina, supra note 14, at 265
(noting that member states are subject to the supervision of the Commission).
96. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 41 (a).
97. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41 (e).
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recommendations to states to adopt progressive measures to improve
human rights;9s and investigating and issuing opinions on complaints
of human rights abuses."
There are three major ways the Commission can aid women in
improving their domestic human rights situations.
First, the
Commission can issue reports documenting violations of women's
human rights.1" Second, the Commission can issue advisory opinions
on domestic legislation that violates women's human rights.' Third,
the Commission can hear individual cases."'2
The Commission has the capacity to process cases brought by
individuals from member states under its optional protocol. 3 In
order for the Commission to process an individual case, the
individual must first show that a member state perpetrated the
alleged human rights violation.tM A state can commit a human rights
violation by the actions of its agents, °5 by failing to prevent a violation
by a non-state actor,'
or by failing to pursue and prosecute a
98. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 41(b).
99. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 41 (f); Medina, supranote 14, at 265.
100. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 41(c).
101. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 41(e); see also Medina, supra note 14, at 270.
In order for this remedy to be effective, women must use internal political pressure to persuade
their states to seek advisory opinions. Id. The Commission will only comment on the
compatibility of domestic legislation to the Convention or Declaration if a state seeks an
advisory opinion, or if an individual brings a case alleging a law is violating her human rights.
Id. at 265. In the latter case, the Commission can only recommend that the state suspend
implementation of the law in violation of that individual's rights. Id. The Commission cannot
hold that a law contravenes the Convention or Declaration when hearing individual cases. Id.
102. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 44.
103. See American Convention, supranote 1, art. 44 (allowing any person, group, or NGO
legally recognized by one or more member states to lodge petitions with the Commission).
104. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 44.
105. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing decisions interpreting the states' duty to
ensure human rights under Article 1 of the Convention); see also Kristine M. Culliton, Findinga
Mechanism toEnforce Women's Right to StateProtectionfrom Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV.

INT'L LJ. 507, 522 (1993) ("Under international law, state responsibility is imputed to the state
if the actions of police, municipal judges, or other low-level state agents constitute an official
practice that is 'carried out by the government or at least tolerated by it.'"). The standard of
proof to show state tolerance of human rights abuses is more lax under international law than
in domestic courts. Id. at 522-23. International courts, however, may be less lenient in their
interpretation of state action for property rights violations, than they are in domestic violence
cases. In domestic violence cases, without state intervention, the violence continues and
escalates, causing further injury. Id. at 522. In the case of property rights, without state
intervention, further injury will continue, but the primary violation is one of economic rights.
The Court may find that international law requires states to be more vigilant in protecting
physical rights than in protecting economic rights. However, paradoxically, without economic
rights it is very difficult for women to escape violations of their physical rights. See discussion
supranotes 17-23 and accompanying text.
106. See discussion infra Part I.B.3 (describing a decision in which the Court held that a
state fails to fulfill its duty to ensure human rights when the state falls to prevent non-
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violation by a non-state actor.0 7 An individual bringing a complaint
must also show that she exhausted all available domestic remedies.'
The Commission makes exceptions to this requirement in cases
where the claimant can show that she was unable to exhaust those
remedies because the remedies available do not provide adequate
due process,'09 the state denied her access to remedies, 0 or the state
has unduly delayed a decision on the remedies."' The burden falls
on the accused state to show that domestic remedies are available and
effective." 2 A complainant must file his or her case with the
Commission within six months of the date that the complainant's
domestic court notified her of its final judgment."' In cases where
the complainant has not exhausted her remedies, she must bring her
a reasonable time after the events complained of
case within
4
occurred.1

Once an individual fulfills the procedural requirements, the
The
Commission processes the petition or communication."'
Commission applies the Convention if the state accused is a party to
it."6 Otherwise, the Commission applies the Declaration. 7 When
reviewing a case, the Commission solicits relevant information from
the accused state, then requests input from other parties on that
governmental actors from violating human rights); Culliton, supra note 105, at 522-23
(reporting that under general international law, as well as human rights covenants, states may
be responsible for human rights violations committed by individuals if the states fail to exercise
due diligence in preventing and responding to human rights violations).
107. See discussion infra Part III.B.2; see also Culliton, supra note 105, at 523 ("[S]tates have a
duty to 'prevent, investigate, and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
[American] Convention.'").
108. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(1) (a); The OAS and the Inter-American System,

supra note 87 (describing the requirement that complainants first seek remedies for human
rights violations within their domesticjudicial systems).
109. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2)(a); Culliton, supra note 105, at 524
(arguing that the due process exception should apply where the complainant can show that
gender bias exists within a state's legal system).
110. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2) (b); Culliton, supra note 105, at 524
(arguing that this condition would be fulfilled if the complainant could show that her domestic
law prevented her from obtaining a remedy or that conditions within her country prevented
her from obtaining the remedies available under domestic law).
111. American Convention, supra note 1,art. 46(2)(c).
112. See Culliton, supranote 105, at 524 (asserting that "[tihe Inter-American System is the
most flexible and generous" in applying the exhaustion requirement).
113. American Convention, supranote 1,art. 46(1)(b).
114. The OAS and the Inter-American System, supranote 87.

115. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 48(1).
116. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 44; The OAS and the Inter-Amefican System, supra

note 87.
117. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 44; The OAS and the Inter-American System, supra

note 87.
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state's response." The Commission may also investigate by making
on-site visits and requesting further information from the parties." 9
The Commission then prepares an unpublished report, which it
distributes to all states concerned, making recommendations on how
to resolve the situation. 20 If the accused state does not implement
the Commission's suggestions within a given period of time, the
Commission can either prepare a second
published report or forward
2
'
Court.1
Inter-American
the
to
the case
2.

Inter-American Court

Although the Inter-American Court (the "Court") is located in San
Jose, Costa Rica, the Court may convene in any member state by
majority vote of the Court. 2 2 The Court has both contentious 23 and
advisory jurisdiction.2 4 The OAS General Assembly elects the seven
judges who make up the court'25 Before any party may bring a case
to the Court
against a state, that state must recognize the Court's
2 6
jurisdiction.

Only member states or the Commission can bring issues to the
Court under its advisory jurisdiction. 27 In its advisory capacity, the
Court may interpret the Convention or any other human rights treaty
that applies in the Americas. At a state's request, the Court can also

118. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 48(1)(a).
119. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 48(l)(d), 48(1)(e).
120. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 50.
121. See American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 51(1), 51(3) (stating that a finding that
the accused state failed to take adequate corrective measures requires the vote of an absolute
majority of the Commission); The OAS and the Inter-American System, supra note 87 (stating that
the second report is normally similar to the first unpublished report).
122. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1996, Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 163, OEA/ser. L.V/II.91-92. doc. 31 rev.3 art. 3
[hereinafter Inter-American Court of Human Rights]; American Convention, supra note 1, art. 58
(stating that the Court's members may change the Court's seat by a two-thirds vote).
123. For the purposes of this Comment, the contentiousjurisdiction of the Court deals with
its ability to hear actual cases or controversies.
124. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 64; Medina, supranote 14, at 267.
125. American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 52(1), 53(1).
126. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 62(1), 62(3) (explaining that a state
recognizes the Court's jurisdiction by executing a declaration in which it accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court, either for a specified period of time or for a specified case); InterAmerican Court ofHuman Rights, supranote 122, art. 2(1).
127. SeeAmerican Convention, supranote 1, art. 64 (describing the right of states to consult
the Court for interpretations of international human rights treaties); Inter-American Court of
HumanRights, supranote 122, art. 2 (2).
128. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 64(1).
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issue an opinion on the compatibility of that state's laws with the
Convention."
The Court can also rule on cases through its contentious
jurisdiction" Either the Commission or a member state can submit
cases to the Court'' Individuals bringing cases must first take their
case to the Commission, which then determines whether to forward
the case to the Court.'32 The Court can issue a decision finding
whether there was a violation of the complainant's rights, order that
the state allow the individual the enjoyment of her rights, and award
compensation.
In its contentious jurisdiction, the Court cannot
rule on the consistency of a law with the Convention or other human
rights treaties. 3 4 The Court can only rule on whether a state violated
the individual's rights and freedoms in the enforcement of the law. 5
For this reason, the Commission cannot ask the Court to exercise its
advisory jurisdiction over non self-executing laws.'
Arguably, the
129. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 64(2).
130. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 62 (3); Medina, supranote 14, at 268.
131. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 61(1).
132. American Convention, supra note 1, arts. 44, 50(3), 61 (stating that the Commission
can hear petitions from individuals, that the Commission can vote to forward cases to the Court,
and that the Court can hear cases forwarded by the Commission); Medina, supra note 14, at
268.
133. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 63(1).
134. See International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in
Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of Dec. 9, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 14 at 7-8 (Dec. 9)
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion 14], 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. 1516 (Ct. H.R.) (articulating
the authority of the Court to judge the consistency of domestic legislation with international
human rights treaties). The Court further states that the Commission cannot take a domestic
law involved in a case it is considering under its contentious jurisdiction and forward that law to
the Court for the Court's advisory opinion. Id. at 9. The law can only be considered as an
expression of the state's intent. Id. The Commission justifies this distinction by asserting that
advisoryjurisdiction, by its nature, does not allow a state the same opportunities to defend itself
as contentiousjurisdiction. Id.
135. Advisory Opinion 14, supra note 134, at 7; 1994 Inter-Am.Y.B. on H.R. at 1516.
If the case were to come to the Court after the completion of the proceedings
described in the relevant articles, the Court would have to weigh and decide whether
the action attributed to the State constitutes a violation of the rights and freedoms
protected under the Convention, regardless of whether or not such action is
consistent with the State's domestic law. If the Court were to find the existence of
such a violation, it would have to hold that the injured party be guaranteed the
enjoyment of the rights or freedoms that have been violated and, if appropriate, that
the consequences of such violation be redressed and compensation be paid .... The
contentious jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and freedoms of
specific individuals, not to resolve abstract questions.
Advisory Opinion 14, supra note 134, at 11, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1536.
136. Advisory Opinion 14, supra note 134, at 11, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1534
(defining non self-executing laws as those which "empower the authorities to adopt measures
pursuant to them.").
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Court could consider self-executing laws under its advisory
jurisdiction as the violation occurs upon promulgation.!ss

III. INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO WOMEN IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM AND THEIR APPLICATION BY THE COURT AND COMMISSION
A.

Rights Guaranteedby Human Rights Instruments

The Declaration and the Convention guarantee a wide range of

rights, including the right to propertyus Both instruments prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex. 9 The Convention includes a right
to equal protection before the law and a right to judicial protection. 4 '
The Convention enumerates several other rights that are effectively
impracticable without property rights, 14' including the right to
personal liberty, 2 the right to freedom of movement and
residence, 4 3 and the right not to enter into a marriage without the
full consent of both parties.'44
The Convention describes the duties of the states to make these
rights a reality14 First, the Convention requires individual states to
ensure that all persons subject to its jurisdiction can fully exercise the
rights the Convention guarantees. 4 1 The duty to "ensure" human
rights requires the states to stop human rights violations by both
public and private actors. 47 Second, the Convention asserts that the
137. Advisory Opinion 14, supra note 134, at 11, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1534 ("In
the case of self-executing laws .... the violation of human rights, whether individual or
collective, occurs upon their promulgation. Hence, a norm that deprives a portion of the
population of some of its rights-for example, because of race-automatically injures all the
members of that race.").
138. SeeAmerican Convention, supranote 1, art. 21 (guaranteeing the right to use and enjoy
one's property and freedom from deprivation of property without compensation); American
Declaration, supranote 82, art. XXIII (asserting the right of every person "to own such private
property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the
individual and of the home").
139. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 1(1); American Declaration, supranote 82, art.
11.
140. American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 24-25.
141. See discussion supraPart IfAl (arguing that a woman who cannot effectively control
property cannot function independently).
142. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 7.
143. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 22.
144. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 17(3).
145. American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 1(1), 2.
146. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1); see Grossman, supra note 26, at 1306-07
(commenting that international human rights law has changed the norm of classic
international law by the inclusion of provisions such as Article 1(1)).
147. Classic international law could rarely hold states responsible for the conduct of private
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measures
states have a duty to adopt domestic legislation or invoke
14
8
Convention.
the
in
rights
the
to
effect
necessary to give
Together these rights and duties provide a basis for women in OAS
countries to pursue equal property rights on several levels. 4 9 First,
women can challenge domestic legislation that denies women the
same property rights as men. Second, women can pressure states to
enact legislation ensuring them equal property rights. 5' Third,
women who are deprived of property rights by private actors (such as
their husbands or brothers) can use these instruments to force the
state to protect their rights against those private actors. 5' Fourth,
women can challenge discriminatory treatment by courts that refuse
to uphold their rights under either the treaties or domestic
Finally, under the Declaration and the Convention,
legislation.
women can challenge discriminatory acts by their governments. An
example of such an act would be refusals by local land boards to
distribute property to women to which they are legally entitled."
B. Similar Rights Consideredby the Court and Commission
1. Bringing Domestic Legislation into Compliance
The Court addressed the problem of domestic legislation that
contravenes the Convention in examining Provision 140 of the new
The Inter-American Commission on
Peruvian Constitution.'56
individuals. See Grossman, supranote 26, at 1306-07 (discussing the duties which arise for states
from the obligation to ensure, including the duties to prevent, investigate, and punish human
rights violations); see also discussion infraPart HLI.B (discussing the Court's interpretation of the
extent of the duty to ensure).
148. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 2.
149. See Grossman, supra note 26, at 1307 (arguing that the structure and flexibility of the
Inter-American and European Systems for the protection of human rights provides excellent
opportunities for women to contest violations of their human rights).
150. See infranotes 155-63 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text. It is important to note that the role of
the Commission and Court is strictly to determine violations of the Declaration and
Convention. See Case 11.227, Inter-Am. C.H.R1 93, 98, OEA/ser. L./VII.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997)
(stating that neither body will revise the decision of a national court for a mistake of fact or
law).
154. See American Declaration, supra note 82, art. II (guaranteeing equality before the law

without distinction on the basis of sex); American Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1)
(describing the states' duty to ensure human rights to all its subjects without discrimination on
the basis ofsex).
155. See Rules and Realities, supranote 20 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack of
equal property rights has been a hindrance to women attempting to claim development rights).
156. See Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 4-9, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1512
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Human Rights sought an advisory opinion from the Court to
determine the rights and responsibilities of officials who promulgate
laws that constitute a violation of the Convention. 7 Provision 140, a
proposed provision to the new Peruvian Constitution, would have
expanded the application of the death penalty." The Convention,
however, guarantees the right to life. 5 9 Part of that guarantee is an
obligation for states that have not abolished the death penalty not to
extend it to any new crimes.'
In the Peruvian case, the Court asserted that it had full authority to
interpret binding human rights instruments and to determine
whether domestic legislation was compatible with them.' 6' The Court
found that the obligation under the Convention to adopt legislation
to give effect to human rights includes an obligation not to adopt
legislation that would violate those rights. 62 The Court restated the
general principle of international law that states must comply with

(noting that death penalty language in the Peruvian Constitution is subject to approval and
subsequent adoption by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
157. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 5, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1510.
158. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 2, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1512.
159. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 4 (providing that no person "shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
160. American Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
161. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 7, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1532. But see
Advisory Opinion 7, Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1 (1), and 2
of the American Convention on Human Rights), 1986 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 13
(Aug. 29) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion 7], 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. 364, 390, 392 (InterAm. Ct. H.R.). Two dissenting judges argued that the interpretation of domestic legislation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Court except in very specific circumstances. Id. The dissenting
opinion asserted that the function of the Court was to interpret international law. Id. The
Court lacked the jurisdiction to interpret domestic legislation unless: (1) it was necessary in a
case brought under its contentious jurisdiction to determine if a state was in violation of its
obligations under the Convention; or (2) a state sought the help of the Court under its advisory
jurisdiction to help the state bring its domestic legislation into compliance with the Convention.
Id. In both cases, the Court's purpose is still predominantly to interpret international law. Id.
For a discussion of the facts in Advisory Opinion 7 see infra Part IlI.B.2.
162. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 9, 12 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1532. The
Court has since reaffirmed this principle in even stronger terms. SeeAdvisory Opinion No. 13,
Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41-42, 44, 46-47,
50-51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), 1993 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 13,
at6 (July 16), 1993 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. 1990, 2002 (Ct. H.R.).
A state may violate an international treaty and, specifically, the Convention in many
ways. It may do so in the latter case, for example, by failing to establish the norms
required by Article 2. Likewise, it may adopt provisions which do not conform to its
obligations under the Convention ....
In these circumstances, there should be no
doubt that the Commission has in that regard the same powers it would have if
confronted with any other type of violation and could express itself in the same way as
in other cases .... The powers of the Commission in this sense are not restricted in
any way by the means by which the Convention is violated.
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treaty obligations in good faith.'63 Domestic laws contrary to the
Convention would not provide a defense to non-fulfillment of treaty
obligations."
Using the principles that the Court articulated in the Peruvian
case, women in OAS countries could challenge domestic laws that
discriminate against women.165 Such a law would violate the antidiscrimination clauses of the Declaration 66 and the Convention 6 7 and
the equal protection clause of the Convention."
In order to maintain the integrity of the Convention, the Court
would likely rule similarly on any law that contradicts it.169 There is

no reason to think the Court's position would change if the law in
question addressed women's property rights.7
However, this
precedent provides limited guidance to women because the Court
analyzed Provision 140 in its advisory jurisdiction.1 71 In order for
women to get a domestic law before the Court in advisory
jurisdiction, they must get their states to request such an opinion
from the Court.7 2 Convincing the state to request such an advisory
opinion could require a great deal of political pressure. 73 The fact
that discriminatory laws are in place reflects the fact that women have
limited political power. 4
Women could independently challenge the discriminatory laws in
the Court's contentious jurisdiction if the state's application of the
163. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 9, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1530.
164. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 9, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1530.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supranotes 116-28 and accompanying text.
American Declaration, supranote 82, art. II.
American Convention, supranote 1, art. 1(1).
American Convention, supranote 1, art. 24.

169. See supranotes 160-63 and accompanying text.
170. Cf Advisory Opinion 14, supra note 134, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.P at 1530-32
(describing the obligation of states to adopt measures as necessary to give effect to the rights
guaranteed in the Convention). The Court speaks of this obligation in general terms. Id.
There is no language suggesting that the obligation to adopt measures applies to some rights
and not to others. Id.
171. Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, at 7, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1510-12.
172. See discussion supraPart 1.0.2.
173. Cf Medina, supra note 14, at 271, 279 (recommending that women lobby their
governments to bring domestic legislation into compliance with international human rights
treaties and to request advisory opinions from the Court when the compatibility of legislation is
in question).
174. See MacFarquhar, Seter, Lawrence, Knight & Schrof, supra note 17, at 47 ("More
women are getting elected, but they still compose only 10 percent of all legislators
[worldwide]."); Medina, supra note 14, at 260-61 (stating that as of 1994, in Chile only 7 of 120
representatives and 3 of 47 senators were women); Robinson & Epstein, supra note 22, at 41
(reporting that as of 1994, women comprised only 38 members of the 305-member Brazilian
congress).
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law violates women's human rights.175 However, a ruling that the state
had violated the complaining women's human rights would only
allow the Court to order that the state not apply the law in a manner
that violates those women's rights.17 Such a ruling would not allow
the Court to consider the general compatibility
of the law with the
77
law.
international
under
state's obligations
2.

Obligation to Adopt Legislation and Other Measures Necessary

Article

2178

of the Convention obligates states to adopt such

legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the

rights the Convention guarantees.

71

The Court has rejected the

argument that this clause merely empowers states to enact such

measures if they so choose.8 In its advisory opinion to Costa Rica 8'
regarding the right to reply, 82 the Court stated that such an
175. See discussion supraPart 11.0.2.
176. See discussion supraPart 1.C.2.
177. Seediscussion supraPart 1.C.2.
178. The legislative history of Article 2 emphasizes its purpose. See Advisory Opinion 7,
supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 388 (stating that the drafters of the Convention
added Article 2 during the last stage of drafting). The drafters of the Convention excluded
Article 2 from earlier drafts because they believed that the obligation to ensure the rights
guaranteed was the natural consequence of an international treaty. Id. However, Chile
proposed the inclusion of Article 2 as a complement to Article 1 to make the rights announced
by the Convention more certain and to overtly impose the obligation of making those rights
effective. Id.
179. American Convention, supranote 1, art. 2; see also Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161,
1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 388.
It is evident that this article of the Convention imposes a duty on the States Parties to
adopt the measures necessary to make the rights and freedoms recognized by the
Convention effective. These rights are not conditioned on the existence of pertinent
norms in the domestic law of the States Parties. Rather, the States Parties are
obligated to adopt legislative or other means, if they do not already exist, to make
these rights and freedoms effective.
Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161,1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R at 388.
180. Advisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 374.
181. Advisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.. at 374. Costa Rica
requested an advisory opinion from the Court on three issues related to the relationship
between Article 14(1) (the Right to Reply) and Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. Id. at
366. The first issue was whether the right to the full exercise could be sufficiently guaranteed
by Costa Rica's commitment to the Convention. Id. at 370. The second was, assuming the
treaty obligations were not sufficient, whether Costa Rica had an international obligation to
enact further measures giving effect to the right to reply. I& at 372-74. The third was whether
the word "law" at the end of Article 14 is meant in its broadest sense to include regulatory
provisions and executive decrees. Id. at 376-78. The Court held that Article 14(1) is an
internationally enforceable right. Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on
H.R. at 380. The Court further held that if the right to reply is not enforceable under domestic
law, the state must enact measures to give effect to the right. Id. at 380. Measures that give
effect to the right may include all domestic measures necessary (including regulatory
provisions, executive agreements, etc.). Id. If a state adopts measures placing restrictions on a
right, the state must enact those restrictions as laws. I&
182. See American Convention, supranote 1, art. 14 (defining the right to reply as the right
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interpretation of Article 2 would be inconsistent with the standards of
treaty interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties ("Vienna Convention").ss This interpretation violates the
Vienna Convention because it is inconsistent with the ordinary
meaning of the terms and context of the American Convention.
According to the advisory opinion requested by Costa Rica, the
states' obligation to ensure human rights goes well beyond the
enactment of legislation regarding enforcement.lss
The Court
asserted that situations of human rights violations within states gave
rise to both domestic and international jurisdiction.""s The Court
indicated that domestic law no longer trumps international law.'87
Finally, the Court announced that if anyone within the jurisdiction of
a member state could not exercise her right to replyfor any reason,the
state would be in violation of the Convention.'8a This interpretation
of the Convention places an extremely heavy burden on member
states, 18but
proves very useful to women seeking equal property
9
rights.
In the Costa Rican case, the Court made strong statements about
a and there is nothing to indicate that the
the states' obligations,"*

of a person injured by inaccurate or offensive statements made to the public to correct those
statements using the same means of communication).
183. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, T.S. No. 58, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. For a complete definition of the standards for treaty interpretation see id, art. 31(1).
184. See Advisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 372-74 (stating
that "the purpose of the Convention is to recognize individual rights and freedoms and not
simply to empower the states to do so").
185. Advisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 376.
186. See Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.1R at 412 (separate
opinion of Judge Piza) (arguing that because international human rights law now regulates
practices within states, situations within a state's territory can give rise to issues of both domestic
and international law).
187. See Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 412 (arguing
that there is no longer a clear distinction between international law and domestic law). As a
result, it is necessary to analyze domestic issues in terms of both domestic and international law.
Id. This reality challenges the classical principle that domestic law must take precedence over
international law. Id.
188. See Advisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 376 (stating that
the fact that states are responsible for fixing the manner in which the right to reply is
guaranteed does not lessen the enforceability of the states' obligation under Article 1(1) to
make the right effective) (emphasis added).
189. Advisory Opinion 7 states that it is the responsibility of the state to make sure that all
people within its jurisdiction enjoy the rights guaranteed in the Convention. Advisory Opinion
7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 376. Using this logic, women who are denied
equal property rights could hold their states responsible for failing to take measures that would
ensure women enjoyment of equal property rights. Id.
190. SeeAdvisory Opinion 7, supranote 161, 1986 Inter-Amer. Y.B. on H.L at 376 (referring
to language in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention for support).
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Court will not maintain this position. 9 ' However, it is unclear how
this precedent might apply in cases brought to the Court under its
contentiousjurisdicton.11 Theoretically, women could bring cases to
the Court claiming that their states were delinquent in their
international obligations for failing to take measures such as:
defining the legal term "head of household" as being applicable to
either a man or a woman, declaring non-discriminatory guidelines for
the administration of development programs, and
9 3 creating legal
provisions for the division of property upon divorce.
3.

Obligation to Prevent, Investigate and Punish Violations of
Human Rights
Litigants have successfully used the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court to remedy a state failure to ensure their human rights in the
context of disappearances.194 In the Velasquez Rodriguez case,' 9' the
Court found that the state failed to fulfill its duty to ensure human
rights by perpetrating and acquiescing to forced disappearances.'
In
Velasquez Rodriguez, the Court took a somewhat less inclusive view of
states' duty to ensure' 97 than it had in the context of the adoption of
legislation. 9" The Court stated that the duty required states to
organize their governmental apparatus and the structures through
which the states exercise power "so that they are capable ofjuridically
ensuring the full and free enjoyment of human rights."' In Velasquez

191. See supranotes 178-84 and accompanying text.
192. See supranotes 102, 129-36 & 180 and accompanying text.
193. See discussion supraParts IIA2 and II.B.1.
194. SeeVelasquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., OAS/Ser.L/V/III.19 doc. 13 (1988), 1988
Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) 914, 966 [hereinafter 1988 IAY.B,] (holding that
"Honduras has violated.. .its obligations to respect and ensure the right to humane
treatment... [and] right to life" of Angel Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez).
195. See id. Velasquez was a university student in Tegucigalpa. Id. at 916. In September
1981, several heavily armed men kidnapped Velasquez from a parking lot. Id. at 972.
Velasquez's whereabouts remained unknown, and he was presumed dead. Id. The Court found
that Honduran officials practiced or tolerated disappearances from 1981-1984. 1988 IA.Y.B.,
supranote 194, at 974. Further, the Court found that "Velasquez disappeared at the hands of or
with the acquiescence" of Honduran officials. Id. The Court eventually concluded that agents
of the state kidnapped Velasquez. Id. at 988. However, the Court clearly stated that even if it
had not found that government agents committed the human rights violations, Honduras
would still have been guilty of violating its obligation to ensure Velasquez the exercise of his
human rights under Article 1 (1). Id. at 998-90.
196. Velasquez Rodriguez, supranote 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 988-90.
197. Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 984.
198. See Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 161, 1986 IA.Y.B. at 376 (discussing a state's legal
obligation to enact legislative measures to comply with treaties).
199. SeeVelasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 I.A.Y.B. at 984 (holding that the duty to
ensure the full and free exercise of human rights implies a duty to organize government
structures in a way that makes it possible for the state to administer human rights).
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Rodriguez the Court held that even in cases of human rights violations
that the state did not perpetrate, a lack of due diligence by the state
in failing to adequately prevent, investigate, and punish such a
violation imputes responsibility to the state.00 The decisive factors in
determining state responsibility are: (1) whether the state supported
or acquiesced to the violation of the right; and (2) whether the state
took steps to prevent or punish the perpetrators of the violation. 1
If the Court continues to rule in accord with this definition of state
responsibility, Velasquez Rodriguez may be the most valuable precedent
of those discussed here for women attempting to obtain equal
property rights. 2
Women denied equal property rights by
development schemes, local property boards, courts dividing the
assets from a marriage or inheritance, or other means could bring
their cases to the Court.203 These women would charge that their
states had either violated their human rights or failed to defend those
rights against violation. 4 Further, the duty to prevent and investigate
encourages judicial recognition of women's
fights and the
20 5
promulgation of standards for equal treatment.
However, Velasquez Rodriguez may not be indicative of the stance
that the Court will take in future cases under its contentious
jurisdiction. Velasquez Rodriguez dealt with a forced disappearance, 6
an egregious human rights violation. It is unclear if the Court would
interpret the state's duties in ensuring women equal property rights
as assertively in future cases.Y Also, in Velasquez Rodriguez, there was
considerable evidence of state acquiescence and lack of

200. SeeVelasquez Rodriguez, supranote 194,1988 I.A.Y.B. at 984.
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly imputable
to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because the person
responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent
the violation or to respond to it as required by the convention.
Id.
201. Velasquez Rodriguez, supranote 194, 1988 I.A.Y.B. at 986.
202. Seediscussion supraPartl.B.1.
203. See discussion supra Parts ll.A.2 & IlI.B.3.
204. See discussion supra Part lI.B.3.
205. Cf supranotes 193-96 and accompanying text.
206. Velasquez Rodriguez, supranote 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 972.
207. See Grossman, supra note 26, at 1305 (noting that, until recently, the Court dealt
primarily with human rights violations related to political, ideological, and military conflicts).
In such cases the Court's rulings were a reaction to the loss of an individual's life or freedom.
Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 916, 972-74. A state's failing to ensure
enjoyment of equal property rights may not evoke the same response for the Court. Id. at 916,
972-74. The Court may find that the burden on the state should not be as heavy when there are
economic rights at stake rather than the loss of life or freedom. Id.

380

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 8:2

punishment. 2° It is unclear what standard women would have to
meet in order to prove that the state had acquiesced to, and failed to
punish, violations by denial of equal property rights.2 "
4.

Right to SufficientJudicial Recourse

The Commission recently held that the failure to provide sufficient
judicial recourse is also a violation of the Convention. t ° In a case
brought under contentious jurisdiction against the state of
Argentina,
the Commission found that the state violated the
complainants' human rights in the application of its national amnesty
laws.2t 2 In its report, the Commission emphasized that each
individual has the right to obtain ajudicial investigation by a criminal
court, a trial to determine those responsible, punishment of those
responsible and just compensation. 2 '3 Although the Commission
recognized that Argentina had taken substantial measures to
investigate, adjudicate, punish and compensate on a national scale,2 4
those measures could not be used to off-set the state's duty to ensure
the rights of these specific individuals.21 " Therefore, the termination

208. See Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 972, 988 (noting, in
particular, the failure of the judicial branch to appropriately respond to writs of habeas corpus
and the executive branch to properly investigate the disappearance).
209. But see Grossman, supra note 26, at 1307 (describing efforts by the Court to articulate
standards ofproof which shift the burden in favor ofvictims).
210. Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41,
OEA/ser.L/V.II.83, doc. 14 (1992).
211. Complainants had sought criminal proceedings, alleging that the Argentine armed
forces had perpetrated disappearances, summary executions, torture, and kidnappings during
Argentina's "Dirty War." Id. at 42-43. The term "Dirty War" refers to the period from 1976 to
1983 when a military government ruled the country. I& at 44. In 1986, Argentina passed a
series of amnesty laws which terminated all criminal proceedings for crimes committed during
the "Dirty War," and created an irrefutable presumption for future cases that military personnel
who committed crimes during that period were acting in the line of duty and were therefore
immune to criminal liability. Id. at 42. As a result of these laws, the state terminated the
criminal proceedings sought by all six petitioners. Id. at 43. The petitioners argued the
enforcement of these amnesty laws violated their rights to judicial protection and to fair trials
under Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and
10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 41, OEA/ser. L./V./I.83, doc. 14 (1992).
212. Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 51,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14 (1992).
213. Id.
214. See i&. at 50. The present Argentine government established a commission to
investigate disappearances, put several high ranking officials on trial, and established a pension
system for families of the disappeared. Id.
215. Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 51
OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (opining that although measures taken by the Argentine
government provided for economic compensation to the victims, the measures had adverse
legal consequences).
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of the petitioners' cases constituted a violation of their rights to a fair
trial and to judicial protection.216
Women can use this precedent and their rights under Articles 8
and 25 of the Convention?17 to pressure the courts in their respective
states to adequately honor their property rights.1 If a woman can
make a showing to the Commission or Court that her domestic legal
system has failed to defend her rights, the Commission or Court can
issue a report declaring that her state is in violation of the
Convention.2 9 This precedent is particularly helpful to women who
live in civil law jurisdictions in which women usually have equal
inheritance rights to men, but in which those rights are not always
honored.o The Court further enhanced the effectiveness of this
mechanism by recognizing that the rights in Articles 8 and 25 apply
to civil as well as criminal trials.221
As in the cases discussed in previous sections,222 this precedent

should be treated cautiously in determining the future stance of the
Commission and Court because it involved such egregious human
rights violations.ns Although the Argentine case specifically dealt
with the right of victims and their families to litigate,n 4 the Court
sustained the rights of individuals to seek prosecutions for forced
disappearances, kidnapping and torture.ns It is unclear whether the
Commission would take such an activist role in upholding equal
property rights for women. 6

216. Id.
217. See American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 8, 25 (guaranteeing the rights to a fair
trial andjudicial protection).
218. Cf. Culliton, supra note 105, at 552 (arguing that women can force their domestic
courts to effectively prosecute perpetrators of domestic violence by bringing cases to the
Commission and Court alleging violations of their rights to a fair trial andjudicial protection).
219. See Culliton, supra note 105, at 552 (noting that failure to provide effective judicial
recourse is a violation of the American Convention and arguing that states can be held
responsible by the Commission and Court for failing to enforce women's human rights).
220. See Hendrix, supranote 23, at 13-14 (describing how women in civil code jurisdictions
are often deprived of the equal inheritance rights which the codes guarantee). By failing to
enforce women's equal inheritance rights, local land boards fail to provide judicial protection
in violation of the Convention. American Convention, supranote 1, arts. 8, 25.
221. See Culliton, supra note 105, at 552 (citing Report No. 29/92, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser. L./V./lI.82, doc. 25 (1992) (finding that Uruguay's amnesty law violated Article 25)).
222. See supranotes 195, 207 & 210 and accompanying text.
223. See Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 43,
OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14 (1992).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supranotes 205, 207 & 210 and accompanying text.
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C. Problems with theApproach
One shortcoming of asserting equal property rights through the
Inter-American System, and of international human rights law in
general, is its inability to change local cultural practices. 7 As
observed with CEDAW, the fact that rights exist in international law
does not make them a reality for individuals. " There are no
international police who may enforce treaties and Court or
Commission decisions.a 9 Individuals on local land boards and the
women whose rights they may violate are, for the most part, unaware
of decisions made in the Inter-American Court concerning their
rights and behavior.m
However, despite these shortcomings, the Inter-American system
has successfully addressed human rights violations.2 l Though the
system has not eliminated human rights violations, as seen in the
cases discussed, the Court has influenced domestic legislation,s
defended individual's human rights,25 and ordered reparations."
The Court and Commission reports and decisions bring human
rights violations to the attention of the international legal community

227. See Medina, supra note 14, at 260 (noting that, although legal discrimination against
Latin American women has decreased, men continue to treat women as subordinate beings in
most spheres of everyday life).
228. See Southard, supranote 74, at I (describing numerous cultural practices, which violate
women's human rights, that continue in countries which have adopted CEDAW); see also supra
notes 71 & 74 and accompanying text (discussing CEDAW).
229. Cf Medina, supra note 14, at 259 ("[It is my understanding that the ultimate aim of
international human rights law is to strengthen the national laws as much as possible,
international law itself remaining a subsidiary instrument to recognize and protect human
rights and a main instrument to support and give legitimacy to the changes needed at a
national level.").
230. See Medina, supranote 14, at 278 (arguing that education about human rights and the
way that discriminatory cultural practices violate them is needed in order to improve the
conditions of women in Latin America).
231. See Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 IAY.B. at 914 (finding Honduras
violated the American Convention by failing to prevent violation of Velasquez's human rights);
see also Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, OEA/ser.
L./V./II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (finding that Argentina violated its obligations under the American
Convention by adopting amnesty laws which prevented families from prosecuting officials
whom the families believed violated their family members' human rights).
232. SeeAdvisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1530 (finding
that a proposed provision to the new Peruvian Constitution would violate Peru's treaty
obligations by expanding the use of the death penalty in violation of Article 4 of the American
Convention guaranteeing the right to life).
233. See Cases 10,147, 10,181, 10,240, 10,262, 10,309 and 10,311, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, 51
OEA/ser. L./V./II.83, doc. 14 (1992) (affirming the right of individuals to receive judicial
remedy for human rights violations).
234. See i&(finding that, in order to fulfill its treaty obligations, Argentina must allow the
families lawsuits to go forward); see also Velasquez Rodriguez, supra note 194, 1988 IA.Y.B. at
914 (finding that Honduras owed reparations to the Velasquez Rodriguez family).
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by articulating how specific practices violate international law.s 5 It is
unclear, however, what impact the increased consciousness of these
issues will have on the actions of states and the policies that they
adopt.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The first step for women in OAS countries who do not have equal
property rights is recognition by those women that it is part of their
states' treaty obligations to make sure that their human rights are
afforded to them." NGOs and women's activists should take a fresh
look at laws and practices for ways in which states may be depriving
women of property rights.237
Women should then challenge the actions of both their states and
private actors that deprive women of equal property rights.23 Women
should force their states and judiciaries into a position where they
must clearly choose between ensuring women's human rights," 9
overtly denying them, or clearly acquiescing to the deprivation of
these rights.2 ° While exhausting their domestic remedies,241 women
can thus strengthen their potential cases for the Commission and
Court that their states are not fulfilling their duty to ensure.242
If their domestic courts will not honor their rights, women should
file petitions to the Commission.24" The more such cases the
Commission receives, the more likely it will hear one. A decision
from the Court or Commission stating that failure by a state to ensure
that women receive equal property rights is a violation of
international human rights obligations would be another weapon for

235. See Medina, supranote 14, at 258 (arguing that international law is a statement of the
community's collective values and that the body of law is evolutionary, growing to reflect the
recognition that different groups of people, not formerly afforded the status of human beings,
are human beings and therefore entitled to human rights).
236. See Medina, supra note 14, at 278 (calling for the education of men and women
regarding human rights and arguing that "a number of people would be willing to change if
they could realize the implications of their actions and statements").
237. See discussion supraPart lI.B.2.
238. See discussion supraParts II.B.2 &III.B.
239. See discussion supraParts IIIA & Im.B.2.
240. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
241. See supranotes 108-14 and accompanying text.
242. See discussion supraParts IIIA & mH.B.2.
243. See discussion supraPart II.B.4; see also Medina, supranote 14, at 271 (arguing that by
bringing their cases before international legal bodies, women can convince those who apply
domestic law to "shed their prejudices" and apply the law non-discriminatorily regardless of past
practices).
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women to use in their domestic courts.2 Such a decision could also
shift the judicial mindset toward recognition of women as human
beings entitled to human rights. 245
Women should also attack discriminatory domestic legislation and
other measures, new and old, as being in violation of the Declaration
and the Convention.246 While women may not be able to convince
their states to request advisory opinions regarding the compatibility
of discriminatory legislation to the Convention from the Court, they
can still challenge laws domestically by pointing out that they are in
violation of the states' international obligations.247 This approach
may be most useful in applying political pressure during the drafting
of new legislation and reforms.4
This is not to say that women should ignore the gender specific
instruments available to them such as CEDAW and the InterAmerican Commission on Women. 249

This Comment advocates

women concentrating their efforts on the international bodies that
have the resources and recognition to be of the most help." The fact
that violations of the Declaration and the Convention, which women
will be challenging, are also violations of CEDAW, will only
strengthen their cases. In addition, decisions from the Court or
Commission holding that states' actions are in violation of CEDAW
may have the effect of adding authority to CEDAW.
V. CONCLUSION

Human rights conditions for many women in the world remain
dire.25' In order to most effectively address violations of women's
human rights, women's rights activists should concentrate their
244. See discussion supraParts mA-B.2.
245. Seediscussion supraPart ll.B.
246. See discussion supra Part I.B.1-2; see also Medina, supra note 14, at 275, 277 (arguing
that women should lobby their governments to seek advisory opinions regarding the
compatibility of domestic legislation to international obligations and that it would be difficult
for legislatures not to amend legislation in accordance with advisory opinions).
247. Seediscussion supraPart mI.B.1-2.
248. See Advisory Opinion 14, supranote 134, 1994 Inter-Am. Y.B. on H.R. at 1512 (finding
that Peru could not adopt a proposed provision to its new constitution and remain in
compliance with its international obligations); see also Medina, supra note 14, at 275 (arguing
that women should lobby for more advisory opinions on the compatibility of domestic
legislation with other guarantees in the Convention such as equality in marriage (art. 17(4))
and equal protection in law (art. 24)).
249. See supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text.
250. See discussion supraPart ll.B.3.
251. See HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrIcMS, supra note 6, at xvi (summarizing findings that women
in many parts of the world continue to suffer physical abuse and denial of political, civil, and

legal rights).
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efforts on acquiring rights, such as property rights, that will allow
women to better exercise other human rights.252 Where it is necessary
to resort to international law, women's rights activists should focus
their efforts on the international bodies that have the most resources
and influence to help them. 3 Women living in OAS countries whose
judicial systems do not honor their human rights have few legal
options.24 Using the Court and Commission to pursue equal
property rights is an important opportunity to improve the human
rights conditions for women in Latin America.25

252. Seediscussion supra Part HAIl.
253. See discussion supraPart II.B.
254. Seediscussion supraPart II..
255. Cf Grossman, supra note 26, at 1306 (arguing that the Commission and Court can play
a valuable role in the promotion of women's rights); Medina, supra note 14, at 270 (advocating
that women make international legal organs their own by utilizing them in the defense of
women's human rights).

